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Once upon a time, there was a great financial wizard called Bernie Madoff who
operated Madoff Investment Securities LLC, a magic box that gave you money every
time you opened it; promising to consistently beat the market index by 1-2%,
regardless of movements in the market. To be a part of this "magic" though, one has
to wilfully suspend his disbelief, along with his wallet – no questions asked. And so
began a real-life retelling of The Emperor's New Clothes, where, over a ten-year
period, Madoff played the tailor and everyone else, the unfortunate emperor.
Harry Markopolos, a financial consultant, and now, author, is credited for being
among the first to point out that the emperor was, in fact, naked. In as early as
2000, he flagged his observations to the US Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC); that it would be quite impossible to achieve the kind of gains that Madoff
claimed to deliver. Alas and alack, as his book title put succinctly, No One Would
Listen. Meanwhile, investors flocked to Madoff in droves. So assured they were of
the fat returns that he promised that many literally begged him to take their money
so that they could be a part of this win-hands-down investment. "He was simply a
guy you gave your money to, to do whatever he wanted to do with it, and in return
he handed you a nice profit. He was the Wizard of Oz, and he made everybody so happy that they didn't want to
look behind the curtain," Markopolos wrote.
For a long time, that was indeed the case as Madoff’s investors saw themselves as part of a privileged set that
gained entry into the inner sanctum of Wall Street’s hallowed movers and shakers. The condition for their entry was
never to speak of Madoff. In fact, Markopolos observed that Madoff's clients seemed to believe that they were
picked precisely because Madoff himself believed they could be discrete. And so, "they felt extremely fortunate that
he had agreed to accept them as clients" – as if it was a privilege to have parted their money with Madoff.
The tailor's secret to invisibility cloaks
Despite the consistently good returns, the direction of bets made by Madoff’s fund showed only a 6% correlation
with the overall market. In other words, only 6% of the bets that he made coincided with the general market's
direction, thus suggesting that Madoff made enough to cover for the losses stemming from the remaining 94% of the
time when he bet against the markets. Huge odds, undeniably, yet some of the richest and most powerful on Wall
Street believed it. Why? Madoff’s fund operated on the mystique surrounding the man himself. Information was
shared on a strictly 'need to know' basis and clients’ money was parked there, with the fund having full discretion to
invest it without having to first hold discussions with the client. External investors who would normally insist on their
rights to do a thorough round of checks before parting with their money were denied access to information.
"The only entrance to Madoff was through an approved feeder fund. That meant his actual investors couldn't ask
him any questions, and they had to rely completely on their funds – who were being well rewarded – to conduct due
diligence," wrote Markopolos.
This "unique structure" provided Madoff with significant advantages as it allowed him to amass large amounts of
money – to the tune of approximately three times that of some of the world's largest known hedge funds in the late
1990s – as Markopolos uncovered while he was trying to figure out the size of Madoff's operations. This was on top
of the fact that Madoff had not registered with the SEC as a hedge fund, which gave him free reign to do as he
pleased, to fly below the radar and to remain shrouded in secrecy. "He was the largest hedge fund in the world by
far – and most market professionals didn't even know he existed!"
Despite all of that, funds continued to invest their clients' money with Madoff, so long as the returns came rolling in.
Many even thought Madoff's fund was doing them a favour by deigning to accept their money into his sacred circle
of trust. With the gravy train going full steam ahead, what could possibly spoil the party? As the saying goes,
'Mother Theresa does not work on Wall Street', so money is as money does.
Invisible, but only to the stupid
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How is it possible to consistently beat the market? Such a 'record' would fail the efficient markets theory; that well
functioning markets, at any time, priced in all available information available to all the relevant players, is reflected in
the price of the commodity being traded. People can win money or lose money betting on the direction of the
market; but in the long run, no one can consistently beat the market – or at least, as often as 94% of the time.
Ironically, the story of Markopolos’ own obsession with exposing Madoff more or less started with him, trying to
replicate Madoff's successes. Pressured by his peers at his brokerage firm to design a financial product that would
yield Madoff-like returns, Markopolos made several attempts to attain Madoff's consistent odds, albeit
unsuccessfully. "We started throwing numbers into the Bloomberg terminals… We created scenarios: How do we
construct this so we succeed regardless of whether the market goes up, goes sideways, or goes down?" After many
rounds of ploughing through the data, Markopolos finally concluded what he had suspected: Madoff's returns were a
scam.
There were other tell-tale signs that should have raised a red flag for anyone who bothered to notice. According to
Markopolos' calculations, at the scale Madoff was reportedly operating, the size of his trades on behalf of clients
would have shown up on the Bloomberg terminals that give instantaneous price updates and state of the market.
The man must have been trading billions on behalf of his clients to make those kinds of returns, given the relatively
narrow spreads typical of Wall Street equities on the average. Yet, none of that showed up on data. And although
Wall Street had its ‘dark pools’ of private counter-party trading arrangements that operated beyond the reach of
regulations, that alone could not make for a satisfactory explanation, given the size and the relative returns from
Madoff's fund.
To get an idea of the scandal's scale, Madoff was working in the hedge fund industry which had only 88 firms in
1984 but had grown to more than 4,000 players by 2000. Collectively, they manage more than half a trillion dollars.
At any one time, the scale of Madoff’s trades alone accounted for a significant proportion of the New York
Merchantile Exchange’s (Nymex) total liquidity volume. At his height, Madoff was the sixth largest market maker on
Nymex. When that much money is spread across so few hands, the select few that has the trust of the market
essentially assumes the role of the one-eyed man in the land of the blind.
Another suggestion that the magic numbers were too good to be true was the fact that Madoff kept the same
accountant for more than 17 years – David Friehling – the only person who was allowed to "see the secret sauce"
and to audit his books. Madoff claimed Friehling was his brother-in-law and thus could be entrusted with 'family
secrets'. Markopolos pointed out that while most multi-million-dollar hedge fund companies were audited by the big
accounting firms that would have the prerequisite resources for audits of that size and scope, Madoff stuck with
Friehling & Horowitz, a three-person firm that operated out of upstate New York.
Furthermore, David Friehling was, Markopolos wrote, most definitely not Madoff's brother-in-law.
The emperor puts on his invisible clothes
With billions of dollars hanging on Madoff's shoulders, it is no wonder that even the SEC chose to treat Madoff with a
light and deferential touch. That the primary agency charged with regulatory controls over people like Madoff "roars
like a mouse and bites like a flea" is yet another example of the larger systemic failure. No regulator wants to bite
the hand that feeds it. Madoff was single-handedly responsible for much of the liquidity that fed into Wall Street's
transactions. Better to leave it well alone. In other words, Madoff could not have gotten away with what he did for
so long without the wilful ignorance of mechanisms that were supposed to protect investors. Why? Because too
much in was riding on Madoff’s continued "success".
In 2000, Markopolos went to the SEC with a report that highlighted why he believed "one of the most powerful men
on Wall Street" was a fraud. Confronted with arguments and evidence that gave more than sufficient reasons to
investigate Madoff, SEC faced the grim choice of going after a big gun or making mild noises about market
regulation, level playing fields, transparency and so forth. Given the stakes, they made mild noises. In fact, after the
whole debacle was over, in 2009, Madoff’s own staff made a shocking revelation: that most of the SEC officers who
had investigated Madoff had quietly made enquiries with the firm whether they could quit their government jobs to
join Madoff.
The SEC, set up after the Great Depression to regain the public's trust in the financial markets, now has to re-
establish that very raison d'être that they had a hand in destroying. Markopolos provides in No One Would Listen, a
wish list of pointers he would like the SEC to consider as they recover from the scandal; among them, a call to
"banish lawyers". He wrote: "Lawyers need to be removed from most positions of senior leadership and replaced with
people who understand the markets and institutions being regulated… SEC's enforcement lawyers did not have a clue
as to what Bernie Madoff was telling them about his trading strategy… They couldn't recognise Madoff's obvious lies
because none of them had the financial expertise."
For the man on the street, perhaps this fairytale-gone-wrong serves as a cautionary anecdote for all who
romanticise sure-fire returns on investments; that ultimately, everyone wins some and loses some – the exception
being Charles Ponzi. Be that as it may, there will always be those on America's famed financial street who secretly
look up to figures like Madoff – the fantastical investor with charisma, mystique and that logic-defying gravitas that
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speaks to followers, disciples, worshippers, or even groupies, who, quite desperately, want to believe in miracles.
It is a measure either of the man's genius or of Wall Street's brand of capitalism that even months after he had
bilked some US$55-65 billion of investor funds, was arrested, and sentenced to 150 years, he is still viewed as a
rock star of sorts. A recent Wall Street Journal
(http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704743404575128031143424928.html) article pointed out that
while in prison, Madoff spends his time watching movies, and sharing financial advice with fellow inmates who revere
him. New York Magazine (http://nymag.com/news/crimelaw/66468/index1.html) reported that Madoff receives
plenty of attention in prison, where he gets hounded by fans with requests for autographs and so on.
The naked emperor wears a fine suit indeed.
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